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"CHILD MARRIAGES" IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky, together with one or two sister southern states,
has received a great deal of notoriety for its "child brides" In
fact, so well publicized have been the isolated cases of child
marriages that the practice has become linked with the name of
the state in the minds of many of the members of the news-
paper-reading public. The natural inference, of course, would
be that Kentucky's marriage laws have been so fashioned as -to
permit such marriages and to sanction their valid existence
when performed. It is the purpose of this note to examine the
statutory and judicial age requirements for marriage in the
state and to point out the various possibilities of validity of a
marriage relationship, one or both of the parties to which are
within such an age classification as to be legallv termed an in-
fant.
Of the several statutory provisions bearing upon the ques-
tion, the one most directly in point is Ky R. S. 402.020, which
reads as follows-
"Marriage is prohibited and void:
(1) With an idiot or lunatic;
(2) Between a white person and a Negro or mulatto;
(3) Where there is a husband or wife living, from whom
the person marrying has not been divorced;
(4) When not solemmzed or contracted in the presence of
an authorized person or society-
(5) When at the time of marriage, the male is under sixteen
or the female under fourteen years of age." (emphasis writer's)
The statute, as enacted in 1851,2 prohibited marriages when
the male was under fourteen or the female under twelve, and the
present form was adopted by an amendment in 1928.
3 The Court
-f Appeals has consistently held marriages contracted in viola-
tion of each of the first four subsections absolutely void. It is,
then, clear that a marriage of a mental incompetent,
4 of a Negro
and a white,5 of one having a living spouse not divorced,
G or of
' These are not the only prohibited marriages. Ky. R. S. 402.010
prohibits consanguineous marriages.
'Ky Acts 1850, c. 617, p. 213.
Ky. Acts 1928, c. 156.
' Johnson v Sands, 245 Ky. 529, 53 S.W 2d 929 (1932)
Moore v. Moore, 30 Ky Law Rep. 383, 98 S.W 1027 (1907)
Barth's Adm'r. v. Barth, 102 Ky 56, 42 S.W 1116 (1897).
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-parties who knowingly fail to conform to the tormai require-
menits of subsection (4)7 can have no validity from its inception.
Subsection (5), however, was not interpreted by the court until
1932, in the case of Crumntes Creek Coal Corp. v Napier S In
that case it was held that a marriage in violation of subsection
(5) was not void but merely voidable at the option of the infant.
This result, while it appears to circumvent the wording of the
statute, which as clearly prohibits this type of purported mar-
riage as it does those mentioned in the other subsections, is con-
sistent with the holdings of other states9 and appears to be the
proper one upon the facts. There the father of a deceased miner
resisted a motion of the coal company, before the Workmen's
Compensation Board, to set aside benefits which he received as
a dependent of the deceased son. The motion was made on the
ground that the father had subsequently married. The applicable
statute declared that, "Compensation to any dependent shall
cease at the legal or common law marriage of such depend-
ent."1' Napier, the father, contended that, since his marriage
had been to an infant of thirteen years, it was void under the
statute. The court, however, decided against this contention.
holding that subsection (5) must be read and construed in con-
nection with Ky R. S. 402.030 and 402.250, which declare re-
spectively that,
"Courts having general equity jurisdiction may de-
clare void a marriage at the instance of any next
friend, where the male was under sixteen or the
female under fourteen years of age at the time of the
marriage, and the marriage was without the consent
of the father, mother, guardian or other person having
the proper charge of his or her person, and has not
been ratified by cohabitation after that age."
and that,
"Where doubt is felt as to the validity of a mar-
riage, either party may by petition in equity de-
mand its avoidance or affirmance; but where one of
the parties was within the age of consent at the time
of the marriage, the party who is of proper age may
not bring such a proceeding for that cause against the
party under age."
Robinson v. Redd's Adm'r., 43 S.W 435 (Ky 1897) see Kenke
v. Noonan, 118 Ky. 436, 81 S.W 241 (1904)
S246 Ky 569, 55 S.W 2d 339 ('1932).
PWillits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W 379 (1906) Hunt v
Hunt, 23 Okla. 490, 100 Pac. 541 (1909)
3
oKY. R. S. 342.080.
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The court said that, when all of the above-mentioned sec-
tions are read together,
" it is very plain that, notwithstanding subsection
(5) of Ky R. S. 404.020 positively declares a marriage
void, when at the time it is consummated 'the male is
under sixteen, or the female is under fourteen years
of age, it may be avoided in a court of equity (a) at
the insistence of -a next friend, if it was performed
without the consent of the father, etc., or (b) where
one of the parties who sic) was within the age of
consent at the time of the marriage. But, if the other
party is of proper age at the time of the ceremonial
marriage, he or she may not in a court of equity
avoid the marriage for that cause against the party
under age."
No case involving the question of the marriage of one below
the age of consent has been decided by the Court of Appeals
since the Crumrnes Creek case. In view of the broad language of
the court above quoted, dictum though it may be, in application
to cases other than those involving Workmen's Compensation,i1
it seems entirely possible that the court would in other cases hold
a marriage merely voidable and not void, where it involved a
female between the ages of seven and fourteen, or a male between
the ages of seven and sixteen. It appears, however, that there is
room for considerable doubt that such a marriage would be any-
thing but fully valid if parental consent had been obtained.
However, an additional ground for distinguishing the
Crummtes Creek case may be found. The Workmen's Compensa-
tion statute, as has been seen, gives the same effect to a "com-
mon law marriage" as to a "legal marriage" At common law,
the marriage of a female of thirteen was not void, hence, it
might be argued this statute preserves it for Workmen's Com-
pensation purposes only, it still being void for all others under
Ky R. S. 402.020.
As to marriages involving parties below the age of seven
years, no case has been decided in Kentucky It will be remem-
bered, however, that such marriages were absolutely void at
I In Edgewater Coal Co. v. Yates, 261 Ky. 335, 87 S.W 2d 596,
597 (1935), it was said: "Common-law marriages, as such are not
recognized in Kentucky. However, in applying section 4894 of the
statutes (Ky. R. S. 342.080) it has been necessary for us to apply
rules in determining the status in the same manner as if such mar-
riages were accepted as legal for all purposes."
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common law,12 and that, according to a umversally recognized
principle of statutory construction, the common law rules are
not to be considered as supplanted unless expressly or by neces-
sary implication abrogated by statute. In view of this principle,
then, and of the impelling social interest in the protection of
such infants, any marriage contracted in Kentucky, one or both
of the parties to which was below the age of seven, would almost
certainly be declared void from its inception.
Another Kentucky statute prohibits the issuance of a mar-
riage license in case
" either of the parties is under twenty-one
years of age and not before married, without the
consent of his or her father or guardian, or if there is
none or he is absent from the state, without the con-
sent of his or her mother personally given or certified
in writing to the clerk over the signature of the father,
guardian or mother, attested by two subscribing wit-
nesses, and proved by one of the witnesses, adminis-
tered by the clerk. If the parties are personally un-
known to the clerk, a license shall not issue until
bond, with good surety, in the penalty of one hundred
dollars is given to the Commonwealth, with condi-
tion that there is no lawful cause to obstruct the
marriage."'
In the case of this statute, as with all of the Kentucky mar-
riage laws concerning non-age, there is almost a total absence
of judicial interpretation. A dictum in an old case sustains the
position that a marriage ceremomously contracted, but in viola-
tion of a similar statutory provision would nevertheless be
valid.14 This is thought to be the more desirable holding and is
the almost universal rule of construction of such statutes in
other jurisdictions. 15 A penalty is provided for any clerki
G or
deputy clerk 17 "knowingly" issuing a marriage license to any
persons prohibited from marrying, but no prosecution under
these sections has been reviewed by the Court of Appeals. It is
apparent that the inclusion of the word "knowingly" constitutes
an almost invincible armor of protection to any clerk who
"- 1 BLACKSTONE COMM. 436; 2 BuRN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 394
(4th ed. 1781).
"KY. R. S. 402.210.
" See 1 A. K. Marsh (8 Ky.) 76, 78 (1817).
"Fodor v. Kume, 92 N. J. Eq. 438, 112 Ati. 598 (1920) Ex parte
Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159 (1909) see note 22 L.R.A.
(N. S.) 1203.
20 Ky. R. S. 402.990 (8).
27Ky. R. S. 402.990(10).
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chooses to take at face value the assertion of any applicant for
a license that he is above the age of consent. A penalty of not
more than three years imprisonment is also provided for
"4 any person who falsely personates the father, mother. or
guardian of an applicant in obtaining a license "is
The only remaining statute bearing upon the question of
the marriage of an infant is the one which provides that when a
"c female under sixteen years of age marries
without the consent of her father or guardian, or of
her mother if there is no father or guardian or he is
absent from the state, the court having general equity
jurisdiction in the county of her residence shall, on
the petition of a next friend, commit her estate to a
receiver, who upon giving bond, shall hold her estate,
and, after deducting a reasonable compensation for
his services, pay out the rents and profits to her
separate use during her infancy under the direction
of the court. When the wife arrives at the age of
twenty-one the receiver shall deliver her estate to her
unless the court considers it for her benefit to con-
tinue it in the hands of the receiver." '
It is interesting to note that, although the statutes forbid
the issuance of a license to any person under the age of twenty-
,one, without consent, the above provision m fact appears to
recognize that such a marriage may be performed and to ac-
knowledge its validity This is true even though the female is
under sixteen and has married without parental consent I The
statutes, as interpreted, have apparently attempted to control
infant marriage only by providing penalties for clerks or others
-who aid in the procurement of the license, and not by mvalidat-
ang the marriage, although, presumably, Ky R. S. 402.030 and
402.250 would still be considered effective.
It is therefore submitted, in conclusion, that, as to the
validitv of marriages in Kentucky of persons below the age of
twenty-one, the following situation exists: (1) M1arriages, one
.or both of the parties to which are less than seven years of age,
are absolutely void from their inception, (2) marriages m
-which the female is between the ages of seven and fourteen
years of age, and those in which the male is between the ages
of seven and sixteen years of age, may be voidable at the suit
of the infant or of his next friend (although there is doubt on
-this point where the consent of parents or guardian had been
"Ky. R. S. 402.990 (6)
"Ky. R. S. 402.260.
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obtained), (3) narriages duly performed but wherein one or
both of the parties is above the age of consent (fourteen for
females, sixteen for males) but below the age of twenty-one are
absolutely valid, although the clerk is prohibited, under penalty
of a fine, from issuing a license to any person under twenty-one
who does not have the consent of his parent or guardian, (4) the
estate of a female under sixteen who marries without the consent
of her parent or guardian may be committed to a receiver upon
petition of the infant's next friend, (5) the statutes are in
serious need of clarifying revision.
It is fnrther submitted that the marriage laws of Kentucky
may not, in any sense, be considered more lax with regard to
age requirements than are the laws of the great majoritv of the
states.2 0 The causes of the alleged frequency of child marriages
in this state are, therefore, to be sought in sociological studies.
since they do not result from any exceptional laxity in the law.
JOHN R.. GILLESPIE
0See 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS sec. 29 (1931) Eleven
other jurisdictions have the same statutory age requirements for
females as does Kentucky, while twelve are lower. For males, nine
have the same, while eleven are lower.
